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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

GREGG v. STATE: AMENDMENTS TO THE DNA POSTCONVICTION STATUTE APPLY RETROSPECTIVELY,
REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO ESTABLISH THAT POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING COULD PROVIDE
EXCULPATORY OR MITIGATING EVIDENCE THAT IS
RELEVANT TO PETITONER'S CONVICTION.
By: Robyn McQuillen

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, when a petitioner
requests post-conviction DNA testing, courts should apply any
amendments to the Maryland DNA Post-Conviction Statute
retrospectively. Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 976 A.2d 999 (2009).
Rather than requiring petitioners to establish that DNA testing was not
available at the time of their original trial and that the evidence would
be "materially relevant" to establishing their innocence, the relaxed
standard of the 2003 amendment to the DNA Post-Conviction Statute
allows petitioners to seek post-conviction DNA testing if the evidence
might be exculpatory or mitigating. ld. at 711-12, 976 A.2d at 100607.
Appellant, Donte Gregg ("Gregg"), was convicted in 2003 of firstdegree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in
the commission of a felony. Epithelial cells were found on the trigger
of the gun used in the crime, but neither the State nor the defense
analyzed the cells for DNA identification during Gregg's trial. At
trial, Gregg asserted that he did not shoot the victim and that his
physical contact with the murder weapon came from defending
himself from the actual shooter.
In 2003, Gregg filed a Petition for DNA Evidence Post-Conviction
Review, which the Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed without
prejudice at the petitioner's request. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed his conviction in 2004. In November 2005,
without holding a hearing, the circuit court denied Gregg's Motion for
New Trial and for Release of Evidence for Forensic Testing. Gregg
then filed a motion for reconsideration and requested a hearing and a
notice of appeal, which was dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland. Gregg then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to
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seek the right to file a late appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
which was granted on March 20, 2008.
In both of the 2003 and 2005 motions, Gregg requested relief under
the DNA Post-Conviction statute, which is codified in section 8-201 of
the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code. Gregg, 409
Md. at 704-05, 707, 976 A.2d at 1002-04 (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2008)). This statute was enacted in 2001, and
amended in 2003 and 2009, to permit persons convicted of serious
crimes to seek post-conviction DNA testing of evidence that could
potentially change the outcome of their convictions. Id at 701, 708
n.5, 976 A.2d at 1000, 1004 n.5. The pertinent statute is section 8201 (c), which lists evidentiary requirements the court must find in
order to permit DNA testing. !d. at 709, 976 A.2d at 1005, (citing MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2008)).
Before the 2003
amendment, the statute listed requirements that the petitioner had to
establish, including: (1) DNA testing for certain evidence was not
available or was out of his or her control at the original trial; and (2)
that there is a reasonable probability that the DNA testing will
"produce results materially relevant to the petitioner's assertion of
innocence." Id at 709, 976 A.2d at 1005 (quoting MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2003)). The 2003 amendment to section 8201 (c) requires petitioners to show that the DNA evidence: ( 1) has
"the potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant
to a claim of wrongful conviction;" and (2) that a generally accepted
scientific test is employed to examine the evidence. Id at 711, 976
A.2d at 1006 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)
(2008)).
First, the court decided whether the original version of the statute
or the 2003 amendment applied to Gregg's petition for post-conviction
DNA testing. Id at 707, 976 A.2d at 1004. Gregg argued that the
2003 amendment of section 8-201(c) applied because it was the
version in effect when his 2005 motion was filed. Gregg, 409 Md. at
712, 976 A.2d at 1007 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8201(c) (2008)). According to Gregg, the court was required to allow
DNA testing of the epithelial cells found on the gun because that
evidence could show that he was not the shooter and that the actual
shooter's DNA would be found on the murder weapon. Id at 712,976
A.2d at 1007. He argued that this evidence would be exculpatory or
might mitigate other evidence related to his conviction. Id The State
argued that the original version of section 8-201(c) applied because it
was the version in effect when Gregg was convicted and when he filed
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his first motion for post-conviction DNA testing. !d. at 713, 976 A.2d
at 1007 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2003)).
According to the State, under the original wording of the statute, the
court rightfully dismissed Gregg's motion because DNA testing of the
epithelial cells was available to Gregg at his original trial. !d. Further,
the State asserted that evidence from DNA testing would not provide
"materially relevant" information that would necessarily exonerate
Gregg or implicate someone else in the shooting. !d. at 713-14, 976
A.2d at 1008.
In deciding which version of section 8-201(c) applied to Gregg's
motion for post-conviction DNA testing, the court noted that
legislative enactments that have a procedural or remedial effect should
be applied retrospectively. Gregg, 409 Md. at 714, 976 A.2d at 1008
(citing Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406-08, 754 A.2d 389, 394-95
(2000)). The court found that section 8-201 has both a procedural
effect, by detailing how petitioners are to seek post-conviction DNA
testing, and a remedial effect, by providing a means for incorrect
convictions or sentences to be reversed. !d. at 715, 976 A.2d at 100809. Therefore, the version of section 8-201 in effect when a petitioner
files the motion should be applied retrospectively to determine if the
courts are required to fulfill petitioner's post-conviction DNA testing
request. !d. at 715-16, 976 A.2d at 1008-09.
The court found that, because Gregg's 2003 petition for postconviction DNA testing was dismissed without prejudice, his 2005
petition should only have to conform to the requirements of the 2003
amendments of section 8-201(c). !d. at 716, 976 A.2d at 1009 (citing
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2008)). The court also
found that Gregg had satisfied the two requirements under the 2003
amendment of section 8-201(c). !d. at 716-19, 976 A.2d at 1009-11
(citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2008)). The
presence of another's epithelial cells, while not a guarantee of Gregg's
guilt or innocence, might provide exculpatory or mitigating evidence
of Gregg's guilt and conviction. !d. at 716, 976 A.2d at 1009.
Gregg also argued that the lower court erred in not granting him a
hearing before dismissing his motion. Gregg, 409 Md. at 712, 976
A.2d at 1007. The court did not rule directly on this question because
it already decided that the lower court ultimately erred in dismissing
Gregg's 2005 motion. !d. at 721, 976 A.2d at 1012. By reviewing
two prior cases, however, the court determined that, because of the
purpose of the statute, a hearing should be held if there is a "genuine
factual dispute" regarding the evidence. !d. at 717-19, 976 A.2d at
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1009-11 (citing Arey v. State, 400 Md. at 491, 929 A.2d at 501 (2007);
Blake v. State, 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d at 1026 (2006)) (emphasis in
original).
This decision bolsters the Legislature's intent that prisoners be
afforded the opportunity to clear their name through ever-advancing
forensic technology, which may not have been available at the time of
their conviction. Additionally, Gregg interprets the application of
section 8-201(c) of the Criminal Procedure Article and provides that
an amendment to the statute, which has a procedural and remedial
effect, must be applied retrospectively to petitions for post-conviction
DNA testing. Due to the January 2009 amendment of the PostConviction DNA Statute, Maryland petitioners seeking to file a motion
for post-conviction DNA testing should pay special attention to the
amendment's relaxed evidentiary requirements. Also, practitioners
representing a client who is filing a motion under the statute should
always seek a hearing if there is a genuine factual dispute regarding
the evidence.

